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Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of both fiscal and political decentralisation on 
regional productivity inequalities. The study of the influence of decentralisation on 
economic growth has received some attention in recent years, but very few studies deal 
with its impact on regional inequalities. We analyse the relationship between different 
measures of regional inequalities in productivity, and several measures of political and 
fiscal decentralisation for a sample of fifteen OECD countries. In order to check for 
other possible influences, the analysis also includes measures of public sector size and 
the type of party government. The results suggest a strong negative correlation between 
decentralisation, mainly fiscal decentralisation, and regional inequalities.  




Over the last twenty years there has been an increasing interest in decentralisation all 
around the world. Many developing countries have embarked, or intend to embark, on 
some form of transfer of political power to local government (see, for example, 
Dillinger, 1994). Furthermore, decentralisation has become a central issue in the 
political agenda of developed countries with more consolidated political s ystems. 
Belgium became a federal state in 1993 (Oates, 1999). In the UK and Spain 
decentralisation is an ongoing process, though not without a degree of controversy. In 
the EU the regions are increasingly perceived to be the relevant units for implementing 
political decisions
1. It is not by chance that the constant growth of regional and local 
participation in regional policy delivery has coincided with the rapid expansion of the 
EU's regional policy, and the commitment of the EU to the principle of subsidiarity.  
There are numerous reasons that might explain this increasing interest in 
decentralisation (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). The first of these is belief in 
decentralisation as an effective tool for increasing the efficiency of public expenditure. 
The second is reaction against large centralised bureaucracies not only in developing 
countries, but also in areas such as the EU. The third has to do with the influences of the 
changes over the last decades in the way private corporations are managed. The fourth 
relates to changes in the type of regional policy implemented in the EU. Policies 
designed to stimulate endogenous growth (through the encouragement of small firms, 
for example) are very difficult to run from the centre. Fifth, and last is the demand for a 
closer democracy which could promote public participation in social policy and 
administration. Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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Within the main line of comparative political research with an interest in the 
consequences of federalism and decentralisation there is agreement that decentralisation 
matters important when it comes to issues of policy. Some authors have claimed 
federalism to be superior to other democratic systems, because it provides a better 
safeguard for the democratic rights of citizens in general and minorities in particular 
(Elazar, 1995). Neo-institutionalist economists have also made the case that certain 
institutional arrangements encourage individuals to engage in some economic activities 
more than in others, thereby giving rise to more successful economies (North, 1990). 
While there has been much discussion over the application and influence of 
decentralisation, the empirical work quantifying the economic effects of 
decentralisation is fairly limited, and most of it focuses on issues such as the growth of 
the welfare state and public expenditure. The ‘hypothesis of decentralisation’, proposed 
by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), suggests that decentralisation increases 
competitiveness among local governments and restrains the growth of the public sector. 
This hypothesis has been tested by Cameron (1978) Oates (1985), Heil (1991), Pierson 
(1995) and Lane and Ersson (2000) among others. Most of them have found a positive 
relationship between decentralisation and public sector size when the analysis includes 
only developed countries, but this relationship fades when a wider sample, including 
developing countries, is studied. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature dealing 
with decentralisation, economic performance and regional inequalities. In section 3 we 
introduce and discuss the different measures of inequality and decentralisation used in 
the study. Empirical results are given in section 4. Finally, there is a brief presentation 
of the main conclusions. Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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2. Theoretical and empirical background 
It is widely accepted that the three main objectives of the public sector are those initially 
stated by Musgrave (1959): efficiency in the allocation of resources, income 
redistribution and macroeconomic stability. Traditionally, most public economists have 
agreed that while the first of these functions can be assigned to lower levels of 
government, the latter two should more appropriately be assigned to the national level. 
Decentralisation may generate more efficiency, but may also reduce economic stability 
and aggravate regional inequality. Thus, in recent years these assumptions have 
provoked considerable controversy.  
Emanating from the public choice theory, with roots in the neo-classical school of 
thought, there is a suggestion that  decentralisation could improve efficiency in the 
allocation of resources by better satisfying the needs and preferences of local citizens, 
through better knowledge of these preferences (Oates, 1972). These gains in efficiency 
would be enhanced with mobility of citizens who could choose to live in the jurisdiction 
that best matched their preferences. Regions would also have incentives to compete 
with one another by attracting migrants, making more efficient use of their resources 
and increasing economic welfare. Tiebout (1956) argued that the ability of individuals 
to move among jurisdictions produces a market-like solution to the local public goods 
problem. The individuals vote with their feet and locate in the community that offers the 
bundle of public services and taxes that best suits them.  
However, some authors (Prudhomme, 1995, Tanzi, 1996) think that preferences among 
individuals living in a country are quite similar, and that lack of co-ordination among 
regional governments could reduce efficiency in the provision of some public services. Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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The existence of regional ‘spillovers’ in the provision of some public goods could also 
generate an inadequate level of provision
2. 
There are several reasons why the stabilisation function was considered inappropriate 
for sub-national assignment. Firstly, it could increase debt at local level if 
decentralisation were poorly designed (with central government covering regional and 
local defaults, for example). The benefits of stabilisation would spill over regional 
borders and result in inadequate stabilisation and excessive debt. Secondly, the increase 
in local debt will create inflationary pressures and pose a threat to price stability. 
Monetary stability requires good co-ordination between monetary and fiscal policy 
functions, which should be undertaken by the centre alone. Thirdly, cyclical shocks are 
usually national in scope (i.e. symmetrical across all regions) and therefore require a 
national response.  
Keynesian thought supports these arguments. Decentralisation reduces the capacity of 
central government to use demand policies to alleviate the effects of fluctuations in 
production and employment. Federal and highly decentralised states would therefore 
perform worse. Greater centralisation also permits more efficient determination of 
macro-economic objectives, less diffusion in the utilisation of policy instruments, and a 
higher degree of co-ordination. 
There are fewer empirical studies that discuss the possible relationship between 
economic outcomes and political and fiscal decentralisation, perhaps because this topic 
lies on the borderline between political science and economics. Some of them are 
national studies, which yielded mixed results. Zhang and Zou (1997), Freinkman and 
Yossifov (1999) and Lin and Liu (2000) find decentralisation to have had a positive Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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effect on economic growth in India, Russia and China, whereas Zhang and Zou (1998), 
and Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) have concluded the opposite for China and the USA. 
A second group of studies found high correlation between fiscal and political 
decentralisation and GDP per capita. For example, Oates (1985) shows the average 
share of central government spending and revenues to be much higher for developing 
countries than for developed ones. Lane and Errson (2000) also find much higher 
average GDP per capita for federal countries, and a highly significant correlation 
between federalism and fiscal decentralisation. But the implications of this relationship 
are not clear. To repeat the question posed by Oates (1993), is fiscal decentralisation a 
‘cause’ or a ‘result’ of economic development? Or is it perhaps the result of a complex 
interplay of a variety of forces related to development? 
Recently, several authors have used international data to study the impact of different 
measures of decentralisation on economic performance, though with different outcomes. 
The results of this type of studies are probably less affected by the inverse causality 
problem. Davoodi and Zou (1998) find fiscal decentralisation to be associated w ith 
slower growth in both developing and developed countries. Woller and Phillips (1998) 
fail to find any statistically significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth for a panel of developing countries. 
However, other studies, focusing on advanced democracies, obtain a very different 
result. Castles (1999), in an exploratory analysis of a wide range of policy outcomes 
using cross-national data for 21 OECD nations, suggests that a low level of fiscal 
centralisation appears to h ave restrained post-war inflationary pressures and to have 
been accompanied by higher rates of post-war economic growth. His regression 
includes a catch-up term, as this has proved to be an essential explanatory variable in Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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the literature dealing with ‘convergence’ among countries. Lancaster and Hicks (2000) 
also found the impact of federalism on GDP growth to be statistically significant when 
neo-corporativism is simultaneously considered and a catch-up is term included. The 
results of Keman (2000) indicate that the socio-economic performance of decentralised 
countries appears to be better than that of others.  
Although these studies can be criticised for the lack of variability in the samples used, it 
is also true that these countries share a similar socio-economic background
3, and that 
the definitions of the different measures of decentralisation are more comparable. This, 
however, is not the only reason for which they might be criticised. First of all, there are 
so many potential variables that might influence the different growth rates and wealth 
among countries, some of which (such as public sector size) could be correlated to 
decentralisation measures, that it is very difficult to assess whether the apparent 
superiority of federal systems is actually true. As Levine and Renelt (1992) have stated, 
there is a real danger of omitting some necessary control variables and thereby of 
reaching the false conclusion that a statistically significant relationship exists between 
growth and decentralisation. Furthermore, given our poor understanding of how 
decentralisation influences economic growth, there is a risk of accepting the product of 
spurious relationships (see Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001) for an example). 
Finally, the measurement of decentralisation also has its problems. Not only because 
there are different kinds of decentralisation, such as ‘political decentralisation’ or ‘fiscal 
decentralisation’ (related to what Keman (2000) calls ‘the right to decide’ and ‘the right 
to act’), but also how to measure these different types of decentralisation. 
In short, we might say that there are two opposing lines of argument linking political 
and fiscal decentralisation and economic performance. Emanating from the public Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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choice theory, with its roots in neo-classical thought, there is a suggestion that in 
centralised states revenue maximisation is not restrained as efficiently as in 
decentralised states. Decentralised states would be more efficient in economic terms, 
not only because the dispersion of fiscal authority would restrain overall growth of the 
public sector, but also because it would promote competition at regional level. The 
counter-argument, with its origins in Keynesian thought, argues that decentralisation 
limits the capacity of central government to use demand policies to reduce fluctuations 
in production and employment. Federal and highly decentralised states would perform 
worse. Greater centralisation also permits more efficient determination of macro-
economic objectives, less diffusion in the utilisation of policy instruments, and a higher 
degree of co-ordination. 
Regional inequalities and decentralisation 
The second main drawback traditionally attributed to decentralisation is an unbalanced 
distribution of resources across regions that would generate increasing economic 
differences among them. There are several issues that might influence the final 
outcome. The first is whether or not decentralisation results in more unequal distribution 
of public resources. Prudhomme (1995) argues that centralised public sectors will 
attempt to produce a more balanced distribution by channelling resources from richer 
areas to poorer ones. Conversely, centralised systems may create unequal distributions 
of public resources by favouring politically important jurisdictions. The second issue  
relates to whether centralisation could lead to a higher concentration of private 
investment. Investors seeking closer ties with politicians and the administration might 
tend to choose capital regions. The third point is that decentralisation can provide sub-
national officials with the power to actively pursue economic development policies. Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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This will not only include policies better suited to local needs or capabilities, but also 
several forms of competition among regional and local g overnments, which may 
include granting tax privileges and offering other forms of assistance to businesses 
willing to locate in a particular jurisdiction (Martinez and McNab, 2001). It is difficult 
to assess whether or not they will contribute to reduce regional disparities. 
Both lines of argument linking political and fiscal decentralisation and economic 
performance could also be applied to the level of regional disparities. On the basis of 
the public choice theory, we might expect less regional disparity in decentralised states. 
In the first place, the power to control most of the public budget locally could generate 
more competitiveness among regions, forcing regional governments to deliver services 
at minimum cost, thus enhancing efficiency. Besides, local governments could be 
removed if they failed to achieve standards of wealth and economic growth similar to 
those in the rest of the country. The power to design regional policies tailored to local 
needs, in an effort to promote employment and productivity, would give local officials 
the power to achieve economic goals. Furthermore, as central government would be 
more reduced in size, the concentration of political and economic power around the 
capital region would also be less relevant. 
From a Keynesian approach, however, the weaker central state would play a less crucial 
role in redistributing income among regions, and could not use demand side policies, 
such as public investment, to promote economic growth in the poorer regions. More 
diffusion in policies such as education or health could also lead to an increase in 
disparities among decentralised countries. Related to this is the fact that the benefits of 
regional policies spill over into other areas. For example, the creation of extra jobs in an 
assisted region will reduce the amount of unemployment transfers and raise tax revenue, Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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to the benefit of the inhabitants of non-assisted regions (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000). 
Other less tangible benefits, such as those of a social or environmental nature, could 
also spill over the regional boundary. Since there are effects that spread beyond regional 
borders, totally isolated development policies are likely to produce inefficient levels of 
regional policy and equalisation among regions. 
An important issue in the evolution of regional inequalities in decentralised states is the 
existence of equalisation programs, and of course, the size of their budgets and the way 
they are distributed. Most developed federal states have formal equalisation programs, 
whilst in a large number of developing countries explicit equalisation programs still 
remain untried, although equalisation objectives are implicitly attempted in the general 
revenue sharing mechanisms used in some of them (Shah, 1998, Jun Ma, 1997). Shah 
(1998) also argues that intergovernmental transfers in developing countries undermine 
fiscal discipline and accountability while building transfer dependencies that cause the 
slow economic strangulation of fiscally underprivileged regions. On the other hand, 
properly designed intergovernmental transfers may enhance competition for the supply 
of public goods, fiscal harmonisation, sub-national government accountability and 
regional equity. 
Under formal programs, there is less risk of a decentralised system generating 
increasing economic differences. This suggests that if there is any positive relationship 
between decentralisation and reduction of regional inequalities, it may be of the 
‘inverted U’ type. If decentralisation means almost total fiscal and political 
independence, without equalisation programmes, there would be little chance of 
regional disparities in economic welfare being reduced, because there would be no 
compensating mechanism, and the variables that determine affluence levels would be Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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more likely to diverge. Underprivileged regions would be unable to compete for mobile 
private investment with the most prosperous ones who will be able to offer even more 
advantages to investors, or to properly fund policies designed to assist indigenous firms. 
A certain degree of co-ordination, and funding, would need to come from the central 
government to achieve the maximum degree of equalisation. On the other hand, a 
degree of decentralisation may generate more equalisation among regions, as long as 
there is a compensation mechanism, and local authorities are allowed to design policies 
better adjusted to their own developing needs. 
The two opposing arguments about the impact of decentralisation on regional 
inequalities sheds no light on the issue that provides the focus of this study: are regional 
inequalities in decentralised countries greater than, smaller than, or more or less the 
same as in centralised countries? 
We should seek the answer to this question in practical studies. There are hardly any 
that address this question directly, however. Tsui (1996) analyses the relation between 
regional inequalities and decentralisation in China. He finds fiscal decentralisation to be 
related to the rise in disparities in the 1980s. Again though, very special circumstances 
prevailed during this period of analysis, such as the great amount of foreign direct 
investment in the Special Economic Zones, which are to be found in the richest areas
4. 
Also, the devolution process in China is an asymmetric one, with some regions having 
more political and fiscal autonomy than others. Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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3. Measures of regional inequality and decentralisation 
Measures of inequality 
We will use measures of regional disparities in GDP per worker (GDPpw). Other 
measures of affluence, such as the more commonly used GDP per capita (GDPpc), are 
less appropriate for this type of study, because the existence of commuters produces 
great distortion in some regions. Clear examples of this are Hamburg and Bremen in 
Germany, or the District of Columbia in the USA. Another disadvantage of GDP per 
capita is that it is influenced by the age structure of the population, and activity rates. 
Using GDP per employed worker also presents some drawbacks. Due to different 
unemployment rates among countries, we might introduce a bias in the relevant measure 
of inequality. For example, differences in unemployment rates in Italy or Spain are 
much greater than in the USA. Thus, inequality in GDP per worker employed may 
underestimate the true level of economic inequality in some countries. On the whole, 
however, we feel this to be the best alternative for measuring the economic capability of 
a region.  
Because of the methodology used in some countries (and Eurostat) to report GDPpw 
data, additional adjustments have been made in Austria, Belgium and Japan. In these 
countries GDPpw is not corrected to account for the influence of commuters to the 
capital region, and because of the reduced surface of the capital, the number of 
commuters from outside the region is indeed relevant. The inequality indices for these 
countries have been calculated using an aggregate region including the capital and 
surrounding regions. Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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In some countries, mainly federal states, such as Germany or the USA, the relevant 
level of regional aggregation is quite clear. In others, such as France or the UK, this 
could pose a problem. In these countries, the use of NUTS1 or NUTS2
5 levels, giving 
the same weight to all regions, could lead to widely differing results. We will use 
inequality indices weighted by employment, so that the level of aggregation does not 
heavily influence the results. Furthermore, the considerable differences in size among 
regions led us to use ‘weighted’ measures of inequality, as did Esteban (1994) in his 
analysis of regional disparities in the EU. 
It is well known that compact measures of inequality might not always provide an 
unambiguous ranking of countries. Different indices of inequality are based on 
alternative ethical assessments, as was shown in the seminal articles by Atkinson (1970) 
and Sen (1973). By calculating alternative indices and using them in the analysis, it is 
possible to ensure that differences between countries are real and the results robust. 
In this article we will not only use ‘sigma’, the standard deviation of the natural 
logarithms of the GDP per worker, a measure that has become widespread in the 
analysis of regional disparities in the convergence literature, but also alternative 
measures, such as the Gini, Theil and Atkinson indices. These are more common in the 
analysis of interpersonal income disparities, but they have been employed in the studies 
dealing with regional inequalities (Tsui, 1996, and Esteban, 1994). 
The indices have different degrees of sensitivity with respect to transfers at different 
parts of income distribution
6. All of them satisfy the Dalton transfer principle, that is, a 
transfer from a richer to a poorer region reduces inequality. They are also homogeneous 
of degree 0.  Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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These four indices are: 
1. Sigma:   ( ) ￿ - =
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In our application, xi is GDPpw in region i,‘x is the national GDPpw, and pi is the ratio 
of regional employment to national employment.  
A low value of the parameter e in the Atkinson indices indicates less inequality aversion 
(with e=0, A(0)=0). We will present the results for three different levels of aversion: 
A(1) has a low aversion to inequality, A(3) with a medium aversion, and A(21) with 
high inequality aversion. Table 1 shows the results of these indices for the year 1996.  
[Insert table 1 around here] 
The countries that show the greatest regional inequality on most of the indices are 
Portugal, France and the UK. A(21), however, produces quite a different ranking. On 
this index, Portugal continues to register the highest regional inequality, while the UK 
and France appear in the middle of the distribution, and Japan and Spain come second 
and third worst. The countries with least regional inequality are Germany and Austria, Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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with Finland, Canada and Italy also obtaining good scores on most of the indices. These 
indices suggest a relationship between federalism and regional inequalities that we will 
attempt to confirm in section 4. 
On the whole, the ranking is quite similar on all the indices, with the exception of 
A(21). This is further confirmed idea by the correlation coefficients for these indices 
which are shown in table 2. All are very high, except those that include A(21), an index 
which is highly sensitive to small incomes, regardless of the size of the region. A(1) is 
the one with the second weakest correlation to the rest, in this case because it is less 
sensitive to low values of labour productivity. Obviously, correlation between A(1) and 
A(21) is the lowest. We can expect similar results to these when using Sigma, Theil, 
Gini or A(3), but they could differ substantially when using A(1) or A(21). 
[Insert table 2 around here] 
It is also worth mentioning that none of the indices produces significant correlation to 
variables such as the number of regions, the size of the country (in terms of its 
economy, population, or surface) or the average size of the regions.  
Measures of decentralisation 
Next we present a group of variables that can be used to measure decentralisation. As 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2001) have stated, this is a problematic issue, because 
there is no single or best measure of decentralisation. A country may allocate an 
important fraction of the public budget at regional level but regions may lack sufficient 
autonomy to make decisions on expenditure. It is therefore important to test several 
alternative measures of decentralisation. Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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Nine measures of decentralisation are featured in table 3. Sources and notes to this table 
provide precise detail of each variable. The presentation here provided highlights some 
of the implications resulting from each of the different measures. Since the first five 
variables focus on political issues, we consider them to be indices of p olitical 
decentralisation. The last four concentrate on revenues or expenses, thus we consider 
them to be indices of fiscal decentralisation. 
The first measure, Federalism, is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the 
country has a federal constitution. Only four countries have been federations for a 
relevant period of time. Belgium became federal in 1993, but this is too late for it to 
have had any impact on regional disparities.  
The next four variables (Constitutional Structure, Lijphart index, Institutional Pluralism, 
and Institutional Constraints) measure levels of political restraint to central government 
intervention, and are taken from Schmidt (1996). The Lijphart indices are standardised 
arithmetic means of z -transformed indicators of the federalism-unitarism dimension. 
The other three variables are additive indices. Some of the constraints used in the 
calculus are federalism, the existence of an strong second chamber, or the form of 
government (presidential or not). 
Fiscal Difficulty measures the capacity of central government to influence economic 
performance. Fiscal Decentralisation measures the share of regional and local taxes in 
total revenue. Fiscal Centralisation measures the share of central government revenue in 
total revenue, excluding supranational and social security taxes, so it is not the mirror 
image of Fiscal Decentralisation. The reason for excluding these taxes is that central 
government experiences more difficulty in manipulating these revenues than other taxes 
under its direct control. The last variable, Financial Autonomy, measures the proportion Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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of local and regional government final consumption in relation to general government 
final consumption. This variable focuses on expenses, whilst the previous two focus on 
the revenue side. 
[Insert table 3 around here] 
4. The results 
We begin our research with the analysis of correlation between the different measures 
of decentralisation and the alternative indices of regional inequality. As can be seen in 
table 4, there is a negative correlation between decentralisation and regional inequality, 
although in most of the cases it is not significant. Only the relationships between 
Financial Autonomy (% of local and regional government consumption in relation to 
general government consumption) and the inequality indices are highly significant. 
These results may indicate that federalism and decentralisation matter, but only if they 
lead to more decentralised expenses. In the following pages we will try to confirm this 
first result by introducing new variables into the analysis. 
[Insert table 4 around here] 
Mention has already been made of previous studies that have found a positive 
correlation between public sector size and centralisation (at least for developed 
countries). The detected relationship between regional inequalities and decentralisation 
may be a spurious correlation, while the significant one is the relationship between 
public sector size and productivity inequalities, though it is not clear why there should 
be a positive relationship in this direction. There are also other structural variables that 
could be behind this result. Countries that have been traditionally governed by left-wing 
parties may have been more concerned about regional disparities, and have promoted Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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the poorer regions either through public policies, such as direct funding or tax credits to 
firms willing to produce in deprived areas, or through public investment. Table 5 
includes 3 variables that measure public sector size, and three others that measure the 
government profiles.  
[Insert table 5 around here] 
Table 6 shows the correlation of these variables with the inequality indices and with the 
decentralisation variables. Correlation coefficients between variables related to public 
sector size and those that measure regional inequality is lower than those previously 
reported between decentralisation measures and regional inequality. Furthermore, 
correlation between public sector size and decentralisation is also lower than might have 
been expected. The preliminary conclusion of this survey is that the relationship 
between decentralisation and regional inequality does not appear to be a spurious 
correlation resulting from the omission of variables controlling for the size of the public 
sector. We have also found high, significant correlation between two of the measures of 
parties in power and regional inequality. The presence of left-wing parties in 
government is, as expected, positive and significantly correlated with public sector size, 
but not with most of the measures of decentralisation. 
These results support the hypothesis that both decentralisation and the presence of left-
wing parties in government, probably with more active regional policies, could play an 
important role in reducing regional inequalities in GDP per worker employed. In the 
following pages we will continue the analysis of this relationship, using the multiple 
regression technique. 
[Insert table 6 around here] Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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Multivariate analysis is restricted because of the small size of the sample. Nevertheless, 
it is worth testing to see if the previous relationships are still valid when more than one 
variable is included at a time. We have regressed the different measures of regional 
inequality as dependent variables, and two types of independent variables. First, party 
government measured as the percentage of government years held by left-wing and left 
of left-wing parties, because its correlation with regional inequalities is much higher 
than the other two indices of party in government. And second, the nine variables 
measuring decentralisation and Public Sector Size. Table 7 shows the results of these 
regressions. 
[Insert table 7 around here] 
Results are quite encouraging. Both variables are significant when the dependent 
variables used are Sigma or Gini, though Left % is the most relevant. Among the 
variables that we have used as a proxy for decentralisation, the best result on average is 
obtained with Financial Autonomy. This variable, with Sigma as the independent 
variable, produces the highest R
2 adjusted. The best result for A(1) as independent is 
also when using Financial Autonomy, whereas for Gini the best results are obtained 
with Fiscal Difficulties and Constitutional Structure, and for A(21) with Federal. Note 
that for this variable, with a very high inequality aversion, the fit of the regressions is 
much lower than for the rest. 
We have also tested the relevance of public sector size together with political parties
7. 
This variable is less significant than the different measures of decentralisation, thereby 
suggesting that, for regional equality in productivity, the amount governments spend is 
not as relevant as the decision-making level at which spending and political decisions 
take place. Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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Although we have few degrees of freedom, and correlated explanatory variables, we 
have continued our study regressing the indices of inequality using independent 
variables taken from three categories: decentralisation, public sector size, and parties in 
government. We will present the results of the regression with sigma as the dependent 
variable, because they are very similar to those obtained for the Gini, Theil and A(3), 
though slightly more significant in most cases, with an implicit aversion to risk that is 
neither too high nor too low. We alternately introduce  all the measures of 
decentralisation, Left % as measure of political orientation of governments, and two of 
the variables that measure public sector size: total size, and GFE/GDP. Results are 
shown in table 8. 
[Insert table 8 around here] 
Again, we have obtained some remarkable results. The adjustment of the regressions 
when using Financial Autonomy and Fiscal Decentralisation has increased substantially, 
which is unusually good for this kind of study, especially with Financial Autonomy and 
GFE as percentage of GDP. Adjustment is also quite good when using the other fiscal 
variables.  
The measure of decentralisation is significant in most of the estimation. As in most of 
the previous regressions, the presence of left-wing parties in government is highly 
significant. The results for public sector size are not as conclusive. With Financial 
Autonomy and Fiscal Decentralisation GFE is also highly significant.  
There is still, of course, the possibility that the previous study is omitting relevant 
variables. But this problem would not appear to be as important as it is in studies of 
comparative growth among countries. As a recent review of regional growth Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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performance in Europe has concluded, economic, social and political indicators are 
largely determined by national dimension, which is basic for understanding regional 
growth (Rodriguez-Pose, 1998). There is a multitude of variables that might affect 
differences in wealth and economic performance among countries, but it seems to us 
that there are fewer that might play a relevant role in explaining regional differences 
within countries. One possible candidate might be investment in public and human 
capital. There is good reason to expect some correlation between decentralisation and 
investment in human capital and R&D. Countries that are more decentralised are more 
likely to promote local higher education and research centres
8. Of course, according to 
the counter-argument of Prudhomme (1995), a centralised public sector could produce a 
more balanced distribution of these resources
9. Nevertheless, if such a correlation exists, 
be it positive or negative, it is also reasonable to expect the main direction of causality 
to run from decentralisation to the investment pattern.  
5. Conclusion 
The main conclusion that may be drawn is that decentralisation, and especially fiscal 
decentralisation, does indeed seem to matter when analysing regional disparities in 
labour productivity. The strong relationship between decentralisation and regional 
equality does not weaken when other explanatory variables related to public sector size 
and parties in government are included; quite the contrary, in fact. The composition of 
government is also highly significant. Left and centre-left parties seem to create the 
right conditions for equalising regional productivity. 
The influence of public sector size is not so clear, but our result suggests a positive 
relationship between public sector size and regional inequalities. In the best regression, 
redistribution of government expenditure increases inequality. The reason for this could Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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be that it discourages private saving and investment in the areas where net transfers are 
positive.  
It is also remarkable the different results that we obtain with different measures of 
decentralisation. The most significant, which also produces the highest adjusted R
2, is 
the one most closely related to fiscal decentralisation. Castles (1999), in his analysis of 
the link between decentralisation and economic performance in a sample similar to ours, 
also found evidence to support the hypothesis that it is fiscal decentralisation rather than 
political structure that matters. Of course, it could be that what really matters is the size 
of the budget in regional and local governments hands, but also that this variable is a 
better proxy for real decentralisation of the power to decide about spending than other 
measures, even those aimed at controlling for this feature. 
The consequences of political and fiscal decentralisation are not merely a question of 
academic concern. Reduction of regional inequalities is one of the most important issues 
in the regional policy of the EU. If changes in the administrative level at which certain 
political and budgetary decisions are taken can help to reduce inequalities, it would 
matter, not merely in the sense that we would know more, but in the sense that we could 
do more. 
Unfortunately, the findings here are not adequate to demonstrate the existence of such a 
relationship to a degree that would fully satisfy academics or policy-makers. There are 
several issues that cast doubts over our results. The first is whether a result that appears 
strong with a limited sample of countries, over one year, would hold with more 
countries, in a time series analysis. There could also be problems with the comparability 
of the data and the selection of indicators. Finally, it is still possible that other variables, Decentralisation and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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correlated with both decentralisation and regional dispersion of productivity, may 
influence the results.  
The main conclusion of this paper is that further research is needed into the link 
between regional inequalities and political and fiscal decentralisation. This first step 
suggests that such a relationship exists. Empirical work faces the problem of the 
scarcity of regional data for a large number of countries, with existing databases being 
difficult to access. However, it would be worth the effort to build up a more complete 
database, in order to perform a more complex analysis. Nor is theoretical work a lesser 
priority. The mechanism by which decentralisation may impact regional inequalities in 
productivity (or any other measure of outcomes) is even less well known than that 
relating decentralisation and economic performance at country level. If the relationship 
detected here survives the scrutiny of a more detailed empirical analysis, we will need a 
theoretical answer to the question of how decentralisation matters. Only with this theory 
to give us a true understanding of the process will we be able to take political decisions 





1. See, for example Tomaney and Ward (2000), and Danson, Halkier and Cameron (2000) 
2. The effects of  spillovers in public capital are not usually considered in studies of the impact of 
infrastructure on economic growth. But some authors have a ddressed this important issue in "network" 
type of public capital, such as roads, with non-conclusive results. See for example Holtz-Eakin and 
Schwartz (1995) and Kelejian and Robinson (1997). 
3. One of the variables that may be relevant in making decentralisation effective is a low level of 
corruption. There is evidence that level of corruption is negatively associated with affluence (Fisman and 
Gratti (2000), Huther and Shah (1998)). If we do not control for this variable (as none of the mentioned 
studies relating economic growth and decentralization does), decentralization, also correlated with 
affluence, may capture part of this effect in samples including both developed and developing countries. 
4. Zhao and Tong (2000) argues that the "get rich first" policy and "coastal development strategy" has 
contributed largely to the increase in spatial disparities. 
5.  Defined by the  Nomenclature of the Territorial Units for Statistics, established by the European 
Communities Statistics Office. NUTS1 is the larger aggregation. In some countries, like Germany, they 
correspond to the different Federal States, thus they are the relevant units for analysis. In others, such as 
Spain, the Autonomous Communities are NUTS2, which are the relevant units. But in countries with no 
regional governments is not clear which is the relevant division.  
6. For a detailed analysis of the properties of the various measures of inequality, see, for example, 
Champernowne and Cowel (1998). 
7. We only show the results for total public sector size, because results for GFE/GDP are much worse, 
and for OPE/GDP (highly correlated to total public sector size) very similar to the ones shown. 
8. A good example of the positive influence of decentralisation on the promotion of human capital and 
research in non-central regions may be the Spanish case. After the dictatorship, and between the late 
seventies and the end of the century, Spain initiated a process of decentralisation. Prior to this process, 




decentralising process, 22 new public universities were created, some of them with faculties in different 
cities. 17 of them are located in regions previously without a public university. The total number of 
scholars in the new universities is now around 23% of the total, with a higher participation in technical 
studies (around 30%). The percentage of students is roughly the same. In our opinion, the new 
universities have contributed to a more equal distribution of human capital and investment. The fact that 
interregional mobility of Spanish students (before enrolling at universities and after obtaining their 
degrees) is very low supports this argument. 
9. And perhaps also at the expense of efficiency in the system, because too many centres could not attain 
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Table 1. Different measures of regional inequalities in GDP per worker 
  Sigma  Gini  Theil  A(1)  A(3)  A(21) 
  Value  rank  Value  rank  Value  rank  Value  rank  Value  rank  Value  rank 
Austria   0.0806  14  0.0739  13  0.0033  14  0.0033  15  0.0095  14  0.0455  14 
Belgium   0.1310  7  0.1144  7  0.0085  7  0.0085  8  0.0253  7  0.1137  9 
Germany  0.0612  15  0.0401  15  0.0020  15  0.0055  11  0.0055  15  0.0288  15 
Greece  0.1061  10  0.0689  14  0.0060  9  0.0058  10  0.0165  10  0.1107  10 
Finland  0.0992  12  0.0881  9  0.0046  12  0.0048  13  0.0150  12  0.0987  11 
France  0.1886  2  0.1631  2  0.0199  1  0.0187  2  0.0487  2  0.1310  7 
Italy  0.1011  11  0.0856  10  0.0049  11  0.0050  12  0.0154  11  0.0941  13 
Netherlands  0.1087  9  0.0855  11  0.0060  9  0.0059  9  0.0176  9  0.1473  4 
Portugal   0.1955  1  0.1812  1  0.0194  2  0.0191  1  0.0542  1  0.1787  1 
Spain  0.1322  6  0.1161  5  0.0084  8  0.0086  7  0.0262  6  0.1488  3 
Sweden  0.1428  4  0.1198  4  0.0126  4  0.0103  4  0.0295  5  0.1152  8 
UK  0.1508  3  0.1153  6  0.0131  3  0.0122  3  0.0314  3  0.0962  12 
Canada  0.0962  13  0.0813  12  0.0044  13  0.0045  14  0.0141  13  0.1322  6 
USA  0.1310  7  0.1046  8  0.0089  6  0.0087  6  0.0252  8  0.1340  5 
Japan  0.1425  5  0.1246  3  0.0097  5  0.0099  5  0.0304  4  0.1633  2 
Sources: Eurostat, Statistisches Lamdesamt Waden-Wurttemberg (Germany), Canadian Statistics, Japan 
Statistical Yearbook 2001 (Statistics Bureau, Management and Co-ordination Agency, Government of 
Japan), Bureau of Economic Analysis (USA). 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients of the inequality indices 
  Sigma   Gini  Theil  A(1)  A(3)  A(21) 
Sigma  1  0.974  0.977  0.945  0.990  0.708 
Gini  0.974  1  0.942  0.914  0.977  0.710 
Theil  0.977  0.942  1  0.980  0.983  0.577 
A(1)  0.945  0.914  0.980  1  0.973  0.535 
A(3)  0.990  0.977  0.983  0.973  1  0.676 
A(21)  0.708  0.710  0.577  0.535  0.676  1 
Average  0.918  0.904  0.892  0.869  0.920  0.641 












7   FiscCen
8  FinAut
9 
Austria   1  2  -0.37  3  2  4.2  21.6  51.8  68.0 
Belgium   0  1  0.19  3  3  3.3  4.8  62.2  30.5 
Germany  1  4  -1.79  4  5  6.7  30.8  33.4  82.0 
Greece  0  2  0.64  0  1  4.5  4.3  65.7  29.0 
Finland  0  1  0.46  3  0  3.8  24.1  59.5  68.5 
France  0  2  0.36  3  1  4.7  8.5  48.9  36.5 
Italy  0  1  0.01  4  3  4.4  2.6  60.8  45.5 
Netherlands  0  1  0.33  2  1  3.4  10  56.4  54.5 
Portugal   0  0  0.61  2  1  4.3  4.4  70.1  16.5 
Spain  0  1  -0.23  3  2  6.2  8.6  50.2  46.0 
Sweden  0  0  -0.06  1  0  3.6  32  49.2  71.5 
UK  0  2  1.4  1  1  3.4  8.8  73.9  40.5 
Canada  1  4  -1.22  5  3  5.8  44.7  43.3  76.2 
USA  1  7  -1.62  6  5  7.9  28.8  41  55.9 
Japan  0  2  -1.11  3  2  7.3  25  46.6  79.3 
Sources and notes:  
1 Federalism is coded: 0=no, 1=yes, from Castles (1999). 
2 Constitutional Structure, CS, from Schmidt (1996). This variable is an additive index where: federalism 
0=no, 1=weak, 2=strong; 0=parliamentary, 1=president or collegial executive; 0=proportional 
representation, 1=modified proportional representation, 2=single-member districts; 0=no second 
chamber or second chamber with very weak powers, 1=weak bicameralism, 2=strong bicameralism; 
0=no referendum or very infrequent, 1=frequent. 
3 Lijphart index: scale of federalism as developed by Lijphart (1984) and taken from Schmidt (1996). The 
data are standardised arithmetic means of z -transformed indicators of the federalism -unitarism 
dimension proposed by Lijphart (1984). Negative values indicate strong decentralisation. Negative 
values indicate federalism. 
4 Institutional Pluralism, IP: additive index of constitutional safeguards for sub national governance and 
modes of representations, based on Colomer (1995), and taken from Schmidt (1996). Composed of 4 
indicators (coded 0, 1 or 2): number of effective parties, bicameralism, elected president and 
decentralisation. High values indicate higher barriers against national dominance. 
5 Institutional Constraints, IC: additive index of federal structures, taken from Schmidt (1996). It is an 
additive index that measures constraints that are due to policy harmonisation in the EU, degrees of 
centralisation of state structures, difficulty of amending constitutions, bicameralism, central bank 
autonomy and referendum. Larger values indicate decentralisation 
6 Fiscal Difficulty, FiscDif, is the reduction in central government revenue share that would be required 
to secure 1% of GDP increase in demand, as calculated by Castles (1999) 
7 Fiscal Decentralisation, FiscDec, is the share of regional and local taxes in total revenue. Averages from 
1973, 1983 and 1992, taken from Castles (1999) and calculated form OECD Revenue Statistics 
8 Fiscal Centralisation, FiscCen, is central government revenue as a share of total revenue, averages from 
1973, 1983 and 1992, taken from Castles (1999) and calculated from OECD Revenue Statistics. 
9 Financial Autonomy, FinAut, measures the proportion of local and regional government final 
consumption in relation to general government final consumption. Average for years 1980 and 1990. 
Source: OECD, National Accounts. Decentralization and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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Table 4. Coefficient of correlation between the decentralisation index and regional 
inequality 
  Political Decentralisation  Fiscal Decentralisation 
  Federal  CS  Lijphart  IP  IC
  FiscDif  FiscDec
   FiscCen  Fin Aut 
Sigma  -0.544  -0.297  0.438  -0.265  -0.408  -0.121  -0.393  0.379  -0.700 
Gini  -0.505  -0.356  0.384  -0.170  -0.400  -0.120  -0.350  0.340  -0.651 
Theil  -0.475  -0.284  0.434  -0.294  -0.408  -0.157  -0.353  0.332  -0.619 
A(1)  -0.415  -0.228  0.351  -0.230  -0.295  -0.066  -0.352  0.267  -0.617 
A(3)  -0.495  -0.297  0.396  -0.237  -0.375  -0.095  -0.378  0.342  -0.684 
A(21)  -0.476  -0.194  0.170  -0.068  -0.299  0.113  -0.198  0.214  -0.571 
Bold and underlined: significant at 1% 
Bold: significant at 5% 




Table 5. Public sector size and party orientation variables 




3  Left %
4  Left index
5  L/R scale
6 
Austria   45.9  18.54  26.36  97.18  256.61  3 
Belgium   50.5  15.36  36.65  81.77  208.27  2 
Germany  43.5  18.75  24.50  77.84  198  2 
Greece  37.9  13.81  27.00  100  243.28  3 
Finland  33.0  20.35  12.74  73.51  194.52  3 
France  46.8  18.32  28.70  35.1  111.33  2 
Italy  42.9  16.29  29.04  90.52  201.06  2 
Netherlands  51.6  15.31  36.67  72.07  179.12  2 
Portugal   36.3  15.71  21.64  27.16  128.77  2 
Spain  37.2  15.08  22.76  63.58  190.74  3 
Sweden  59.8  27.63  31.76  87.21  257.29  4 
UK  39.8  21.09  19.22  28.13  84.39  2 
Canada  43.0  21.69  21.87  65.18  130.36  3 
USA  32.5  16.80  16.77  37.78  75.56  1 
Japan  28.8  9.50  16.92  0.93  2.19  2 
Sources and notes:  
1 Public Sector Size: average of overall government revenue and expenditure for 1980, 1990 and 1996, % 
of GDP. Source: OECD, National Accounts, several years. 
2 Government Final Expenditure as % of GDP. Source: OECD, National Accounts, several years 
3 Other Public Expenditure as % of GDP. Source: OECD, National Accounts, several years. 
4 Left %: Percentage of years in power of Left and Left-Centre parties. Source: Schmidt (1996). 
5 Left index: additive index of orientation of party in government: 3(% left) + 2(% left-centre) + % 
centre. Source: Schmidt (1996) 
6 L/R scale: left-right scale of government. A higher number indicates governments more oriented 
towards the left. Source: Schmidt (1996) Decentralization and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
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Table 6. Correlation between public sector size, parties in government, decentralisation 




  Left %
  Left index
  L/R scale
 
Sigma  -0.065  -0.074  -0.032  -0.661  -0.470  -0.204 
Gini  -0.071  -0.079  -0.051  -0.645  -0.440  -0.166 
Theil  0.029  0.045  0.003  -0.615  -0.405  -0.173 
A(1)  -0.038  -0.028  -0.035  -0.661  -0.449  -0.272 
A(3)  -0.077  -0.083  -0.045  -0.666  -0.460  -0.220 
A(21)  -0.250  -0.353  -0.076  -0.581  -0.513  -0.151 
Federal  -0.055  0.199  -0.218  0.146  0.009  -0.127 
CS  -0.343  -0.040  -0.380  -0.179  -0.382  -0.481 
Lijphart  0.169  0.086  0.214  0.052  0.197  0.185 
IP  -0.262  -0.065  -0.287  -0.143  -0.318  -0.450 
IC  -0.186  -0.223  -0.071  0.001  -0.181  -0.560 
FiscDif  -0.574  -0.355  -0.511  -0.406  -0.517  -0.360 
FiscDes  0.008  0.459  -0.360  -0.022  -0.121  0.259 
FiscCen (1)  -0.044  -0.098  0.093  -0.002  0.097  0.023 
FinAut  0.264  0.590  -0.112  0.386  0.288  0.355 
PSS  1.000  0.564  0.842  0.531  0.589  0.382 
GFE/GDP  0.564  1.000  0.056  0.311  0.372  0.518 
OPE/GDP  0.842  0.056  1.000  0.511  0.529  0.116 
Bold and underlined: significant at 1% 
Bold: significant at 5% 




Table 7. Regression analysis of regional inequality with decentralisation variables and 
party in government (Left %). 
Dependent variable  Adjusted R
2   Decentralisation variable  Left % 
A(1)  0.465  Federal  -0.0034 (0.125)  -0.0001 (0.009) 
Sigma  0.582    -0.037 (0.022)  -0.0007 (0.005) 
Gini  0.52    -0.331 (0.44)  -0.0007 (0.009) 
A(21)  0.409    -0.0352 (0.078)  -0.0007 (0.027) 
A(1)  0.488  CS, Constitutional Structure  -0.001 (0.091)  -0.001 (0.003) 
Sigma  0.551    -0.0088 (0.036)  -0.0009 (0.002) 
Gini  0.586    -0.0097 (0.016)  -0.0009 (0.001) 
A(21)  0.334    -0.0068 (0.191)  -0.0009 (0.014) 
A(1)  0.517  Lijphart  0.0021 (0.06)  -0.0001 (0.003) 
Sigma  0.604    0.0193 (0.016)  -0.0009 (0.002) 
Gini  0.522    0.0166 (0.043)  -0.0008 (0.004) 
A(21)  0.274    0.0089 (0.397)  -0.0008 (0.024) 
A(1)  0,469  IP, Institutional Pluralism  -0,001 (0.117)  -0.0001 (0.004) 
Sigma  0.569    -0.0088 (0.079)  -0.0009 (0.003) 
Gini  0.40    -0.0062 (0.225)  -0.0008 (0.007) 
A(21)  0,254    -0.004 (0.52)  -0.0008 (0.023) 
A(1)  0,445  IC, Institutional Constraints  -0.0009 (0.164)  -0.0001 (0.006) 
Sigma  0,537    -0.0097 (0.045)  -0.0008 (0.003) 
Gini  0,504    -0.0092 (0.055)  -0.0008 (0.005) 
A(21)  0,331    -0.0077 (0.197)  -0.0008 (0.021) 
A(1)  0.499  FiscDif, Fiscal Difficulties  -0.0013 (0.077)  -0.0001 (0.002) 
Sigma  0.555    -0.0115 (0.034)  -0.0011 (0.001) 
Gini  0.59    -0.011 (0.043)  -0.001 (0.001) 
A(-20)  0.25    -0.004 (-0.581)  -0.0009 (0.027) 
A(1)  0.5  FiscDec, Fiscal Decentralisation  -0.001 (0.076)  -0.0001 (0.004) 
Sigma  0.537    -0.0012 (0.044)  -0.0008 (0.003) 
Gini  0.473    -0.001 (0.085)  -0.0008 (0.006) 
A(21)  0.279    -0.0007 (0.371)  -0.0008 (0.024) 
In parenthesis: significant level. 
 Decentralization and Regional Economic Disparities. C. Gil, P. Pascual and M. Rapún 
 
38
Table 7 (cont). Regression analysis of regional inequality with decentralisation variables 
and party in government (Left %). 
Dependent variable  Adjusted R
2   Decentralisation variable  Left % 
A(1)  0.426  FiscCen, Fiscal Centralisation  0.0001 (0.213)  -0.0001 (0.007) 
Sigma  0.51    0.0012 (0.66)  -0.0008 (0.004) 
Gini  0.452    0.0011 (0.113)  -0.0008 (0.007) 
A(21)  0.28    0.0008 (0.366)  -0.0008 (0.025) 
A(1)  0.523  FinAut, Financial Autonomy  -0.0001 (0.055)  -0.0001 (0.029) 
Sigma  0.614    -0.001 (0.013)  -0.0006 (0.025) 
Gini  0.54    -0.0009 (0.033)  -0.0006 (0.037) 
A(21)  0.392    -0.0008 (0.096)  -0.0006 (0.086) 
A(1)  0.502  PSS, Public Sector Size  0.0003 (0.074)  -0.0001 (0.002) 
Sigma  0.476    0.0018 (0.107)  -0.0011 (0.002) 
Gini  0.438    0.0017 (0.136)  -0.001 (0.004) 
A(21)  0.233    0.0004 (0.774)  -0.0008 (0.043) 
In parenthesis: significant level. 




Table 8. Regression analysis of Sigma with decentralisation, public sector size and party 
in government (Left %) variables. 
Decentralisation variable  Public sector size variable  Left %  Adjusted R
2  
Federal  -0.0335 (0.029)  PSS  0.0014 (0.123)  -0.001 (0.002)  0.637 
  -0.0399 (0.015)  GFE/GDP  0.002 (0.228)  -0.0008 (0.003)  0.603 
Lijphart  0.0175 (0.021)  PSS  0.0014 (0.123)  -0.0011 (0.001)  0.656 
  0.019 (0.021)  GFE/GDP  0.001 (0.562)  -0.0009 (0.002)  0.582 
CS, Constitutional Struc.  -0.0073 (0.079)  PSS  0.0012 (0.231)  -0.0011 (0.001)  0.573 
  -0.0088 (0.039)  GFE/GDP  0.0014 (0.442)  -0.001 (0.002)  0.537 
IP, Institutional Pluralism  -0.0073 (0.13)  PSS  0.0014 (0.175)  -0.0011 (0.002)  0.54 
  -0.0087 (0.089)  GFE/GDP  0.0012 (0.517)  -0.0009 (0.002)  0.473 
IC,Institutional Constrai.  -0.0083 (0.075)  PSS  0.0014 (0.172)  -0.001 (0.002)  0.576 
  -0.0094 (0.067)  GFE/GDP  0.0004 (0.823)  -0.0008 (0.006)  0.497 
Fiscal Difficulties  -0.0092 (0.118)   PSS  0.0009 (0.4)  -0.0011 (0.001)  0.546 
  -0.0113 (0.052)  GFE/GDP  0.0003 (0.89)  -0.0011 (0.002)  0.516 
Fiscal Decentralisation  -0.0012 (0.024)  PSS  0.0018 (0.051)  -0.0011 (0.001)  0.648 
  -0.0018 (0.004)  GFE/GDP  0.0042 (0.025)  -0.001 (0.000)  0.689 
Fiscal Centralisation  0.0013 (0.034)  Total PSS  0.0019 (0.051)  -0.0011 (0.001)  0.628 
  0.0013 (0.000)  GFE/GDP  0.0017 (0.365)  -0.0009 (0.004)  0.506 
Financial Autonomy  -0.0011 (0.003)  PSS  0.002 (0.016)  -0.0008 (0.002)  0.757 
  -0.0016 (0.000)  GFE/GDP  0.0052 (0.001)  -0.0006 (0.001)  0.859 
 